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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how effectively the wholesale 
interest rates are transmitted to the retail rates, and whether the 
interest rate pass-through is symmetric or asymmetric in Greece, 
Bulgaria and Slovenia. The disaggregated general-to-specific 
methodology is applied for testing the symmetry hypothesis in these 
economies. It is evident from our results that across the countries 
examined there exist variations regarding the monetary 
transmission process and the symmetry hypothesis alike. This can 
be interpreted as an indication of a different level of competition, 
development and liberalization among the banking systems in these 
South Eastern European economies. 
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Symmetric or Asymmetric Interest Rate Adjustments? 
Evidence from Greece, Bulgaria and Slovenia 
 
1. Introduction 
The main aim of this paper is to reveal the existence of a symmetric or 
asymmetric interest rate pass-through (hereafter PT) in Greece, Bulgaria and 
Slovenia. These South Eastern European (SEE hereafter) countries were 
selected since all three are EU members; Greece joined Euro in 2001, Slovenia 
has been a member of the EMU since 2007 and Bulgaria was admitted to the 
European Union in 2007. The three economies belong to the SEE region but 
their level of income, growth performance and size in terms of population, 
differ substantially (Table 1 in Appendix A). A feature common for those 
countries is the relatively fast growth that has been experienced in recent years. 
Monetary performance across the region has also seen significant 
improvements, in the recent past, accompanied with decreasing interest rate 
spreads (Figures 1-3 in Appendix A). 
The adjustment of retail bank interest rates (that is deposit rates that 
commercial banks offer to savers and lending rates that banks charge to 
borrowers) in response to changes in wholesale rates (that is the base rate that 
central bank sets and the interbank rates determined by the interaction of the 
money market participants) is a fundamental element of the interest rate 
transmission mechanism. Wholesale rates are both exogenous to commercial 
banks. The money market rate can be considered as a policy controlled variable 
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as Central Bank authorities can influence and control it through their short-term 
interest rate policy. In our case, the central bank rate represents similar policy 
regimes and thus it carries similar information content across the countries 
considered. For an efficient monetary policy, any change in the central bank 
policy rate is meant to be transmitted to retail interest rates, ultimately 
influencing consumer and business lending rates, and therefore aggregate 
domestic demand and output. In effect, if the interest rate transmission is not 
efficient, the required policy measure by the monetary authorities will have to 
be more drastic in order to achieve the same end-result. Indeed, if deposit rates 
are rigid upward, expansionary monetary policy will have more impact than 
contractionary monetary policy, as deposit rates adjust rapidly to declining 
market rates, but are slow to adjust in response to increasing market rates. 
Moreover, adjustment of the central bank and money market rates may make 
highly leveraged firms more vulnerable to business cycle fluctuations, than 
firms that have access to stock exchange and bond markets. For all these 
reasons, the regular monitoring and assessment of the pass-through is critical 
for policymaking, for the conduct and evaluation of monetary policy. 
In this paper, we focus on whether responses to upward and downward interest 
rate changes are symmetric or asymmetric in Greece, Bulgaria and Slovenia. 
The symmetry hypothesis tests the magnitude of the negative and positive 
adjustment of the deposits and lending rates in response to changes in central 
bank and money market rates. In conjunction with this issue, we analyse how 
effectively the wholesale rates are transmitted to the retail rates. We employ the 
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disaggregated general-to-specific (hereafter GETS) methodology to examine 
the symmetric or asymmetric interest rate behaviour in the above mentioned 
SEE economies. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt made to 
unveil the existence and importance of the interest rate PT behaviour, for the 
sample of the economies examined. It is evident from our results that variations 
across these economies are present as far as the PT monetary transmission 
process and the symmetry hypothesis is concerned. Our results for Greece 
indicate that there is not enough support for asymmetry hypothesis in the 
adjustment of retail rates in response to changes in the central bank rate. In 
contrast, for Bulgaria and Slovenia, we find support for negative asymmetry in 
the adjustment of loan rate in response to changes in the money market rate.  
There are mainly two explanations to describe the asymmetric adjustment of 
retail rates to wholesale rates changes (Scholnick, 1999); the consumer 
behaviour or customer reaction hypothesis (Hannan and Berger, 1991) and the 
bank concentration or bank’s collusive pricing hypothesis (Berger and Hannan, 
1989; Hannan and Berger, 1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992). The consumer 
behaviour hypothesis is related to the degree of consumer sophistication with 
respect to capital markets. The more sophisticated depositors and borrowers 
are, the more reluctant banks will be to exercise market power to their own 
benefit. The customer reaction hypothesis supports the asymmetric adjustment 
of interest rates, with lending rates being rigid upwards and the deposit rates 
rigid downwards. This is the case, particularly, when banks operate in a highly 
competitive environment and, thus, banks may fear a negative reaction from 
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customers in response to lending rate increases or deposit rate decreases. On 
the other hand, the bank concentration hypothesis states that banks are more 
likely to decrease deposit rates and increase lending rates, when they are able to 
exercise their market power and adjust interest rates to their advantage. In the 
case of the bank concentration hypothesis, the lending rates are rigid 
downwards and the deposit rates upwards. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we refer briefly to the structure 
of the Greek, Bulgarian and Slovenian banking systems. Section 3 presents 
literature review on interest rate PT, the econometric methodology and data. 
The empirical results on estimates of the speed of adjustment and symmetry 
hypothesis are given in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Structure of the Greek, Bulgarian and Slovenian Banking Systems 
During the 1980s, the Greek banking system was decisively state controlled 
and highly and strictly regulated1. This started changing in the late 1980’s when 
the prospects for participating in the Single European Market initiated the first 
efforts to liberalize the Greek financial system. A number of institutional 
actions (Karatzas Committee, 1987) were taken and the process of deregulation 
of the banking system has been carried out at an accelerating pace, in the light 
of the need for a more flexible and market-oriented financial system. 
                                                 
1
 For an overview of the historical evolution of the Greek banking system see Soumelis (1995), 
Ericsson and Sharma (1996), Eichengreen and Gibson (2001), Garganas and Tavlas (2001), Karousos 
and Vlamis (2010). 
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Government measures involved the abolition of various regulatory credit 
ceilings (that is, banks are allowed to extend credit on their own terms), the 
abolition of the system of administrative fixed interest rates (that is, all deposit 
rates and almost all lending rates are freely determined) and the initiation of an 
extensive privatization programme2 of the majority of the state controlled 
commercial banks in the late 1990s. As a result of the latter, the Greek banking 
sector is not anymore state controlled as it used to be fifteen years ago. Also, 
foreign exchange controls were lifted in 1992 and capital movements were 
completely liberalized in May 1994, which allowed Greek enterprises and 
households to borrow in lower-yielding foreign currencies. “In addition, 
investment requirements imposed on commercial banks for the financing of 
small and medium sized enterprises and public enterprises are gradually being 
abolished and the compulsory securities ratios on government bonds are being 
phased out, whereas the public sector should meet its borrowing requirements 
exclusively through the money and capital markets” (Tsionas et al, 2003). 
These developments and the liberalisation measures introduced throughout the 
1990s increased competition among financial institutions. 
The Greek financial system is dominated by banking institutions. More 
specifically, Greek commercial banks control 81.2% of total banking sector’s 
assets, foreign banks 10.1% and special credit institutions (the Postal Savings 
Bank and the Deposits & Loans Fund) a further 8.3%. The presence of 
cooperative and regional banks is rather limited; they control only about 0.8% 
                                                 
2
 For an overview of the mergers and acquisitions carried out in the Greek banking sector over the 
period 1996-2008, see Karousos and Vlamis (2010).  
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of total banks’ assets and their activities are concentrated in particular 
geographic areas of the country (Eurobank, 2006). As far as it concerns the 
Greek banking system, this is one of the most concentrated in the Euro-zone. 
Some researchers believe that “this high degree of concentration in small 
banking systems is unavoidable if banks in these economies are to achieve a 
size that will allow them to compete with foreign banks” (Eurobank, 2006). 
More specifically, the five biggest commercial banks of Greece (National Bank 
of Greece, Alpha Bank, Eurobank EFG, Piraeus Bank and Agricultural Bank of 
Greece) own more than 80% of total assets of the Greek banking sector, while 
accounted for 77.9% of the total private deposits and 77% of the loans to the 
private sector (Karousos and Vlamis, 2010). Although out of those five 
commercial banks, only the Agricultural Bank of Greece is state controlled. 
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that newer empirical evidence 
(Hondroyiannis et al, 1999; Hardy and Symiyiannis, 1998) show that there has 
been a gradual shift of the Greek banking system away from conditions of 
oligopoly to those of monopolistic competition. 
After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989-1990, there was a 
widespread privatization and liberalization across all sectors of the Bulgarian 
economy, which inevitably affected its banking system. Initially, the progress 
was quite slow and the situation was exacerbated due to the financial crisis that 
hit the Bulgarian banking system in 1996-1997. The privatization of the 
banking system was completed in 2001-2002 (Frömmel and Karagyozova, 
2008). “In a number of cases, foreigners acquired some of the countries’ largest 
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credit institutions, one after the other, and thus took over the lion’s share of the 
sector in a few years. This “sweep” on the part of mostly Western European 
and Euro-area investors fundamentally changed banking in the region and 
structurally linked it up with EU banks” (Barisitz, 2008). 
The Bulgarian banking system consists of legally independent entities, state-
owned banks, private local banks and branches of foreign banks. As of 2007, 
there were in total twenty nine banks3 operating in Bulgaria. The four biggest 
banks (DSK Bank, Raiffeisenbank Bulgaria, United Bulgarian Bank and 
UniCredit Bulbank) held 43% of total banking assets, 35% of outstanding 
corporate loans, 45% of total deposits and 50% of total equity (Federation of 
French Banks, 2003). The Bulgarian banking market is not as concentrated as 
other European markets and it is currently considered to be fairly competitive 
due to the existence of a considerable number of private banks. 
Commercial banks remain by far the most important financial intermediaries in 
Slovenia, while the share of savings banks is negligible. More specifically, 
commercial banks maintain a prevailing position in the banking sector’s 
structure with a 99.4% share at the end of 2007, measured by total assets (Bank 
of Slovenia, 2008a). The commercial banks account for about 70% of the 
Slovenian financial system’s assets. The remaining market share was divided 
                                                 
3
 These are :Allianz Bulgaria Commercial Bank, Alpha Bank- Bulgaria Branch, BNP Paribas S. A.- 
Sofia Branch, Bulgarian-American Credit Bank, Central Cooperative Bank, Citibank N. A.-Sofia 
Branch, Corporate Commercial Bank, D Commerce Bank, DSK Bank, Economic and Investment 
Bank, Emporiki Bank– Bulgaria, Encouragement Bank, Eurobank EFG Bulgaria, First Investment 
Bank, ING Bank N. V.-Sofia Branch, International Asset Bank, Investbank, MKB Unionbank, 
Municipal Bank, NLB West-East Bank, Piraeus Bank Bulgaria, ProCredit Bank, Raiffeisenbank, 
Bulgaria, Societe Generale Expressbank, T. C. Ziraat Bank-Sofia Branch, Texim Private 
Entrepreneurial Bank, Tokuda Bank, UniCredit Bulbank and United Bulgarian Bank. 
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among the savings banks. There are eighteen banks, three savings banks and 
three branches of foreign banks operating in Slovenia at the end of 2008. The 
banking sector concentration in Slovenia is higher than the Euro area average, 
although the gap is diminishing. The three bigger banks hold almost 50% of 
total banking assets (Bank of Slovenia, 2008b). 
 
3. Literature Review, Econometric Methodology and Data 
The issue of interest rate PT along with the testing of the symmetry hypothesis 
has been undertaken in a number of studies such as ECB (2009), Égert, Crespo-
Cuaresma, and Reininger (2007), Wang and Thi (2007), Payne and Waters 
(2008), Hofmann (2006), Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Hofmann and Mizen 
(2004), Atesoglou (2003), Angeloni and Ehrman (2003), Toolsema, Sturm, and 
De Haan (2001), and Mojon (2000). So far, a variety of econometric models 
have been used in the empirical literature on PT transmission models. Such 
models mainly include the ECM (Engle and Granger, 1987), the Threshold 
Autoregressive model (Enders and Granger, 1998; Enders and Siklos, 2001) 
and the LSE-Hendry general-to-specific approach known as GETS model 
(Hendry, Pagan and Sargan, 1984; Hendry, 1987; Hendry and Krolzig, 2005). 
A more recent discussion of the GETS methodology as well as of other 
approaches (co-integrating vector error correction model, and the vector 
autoregression approach) on how to estimate short and long-run economic 
relationships is given by Rao (2007). Cramon-Taubadel (Von) and Loy (1997), 
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Cramon-Taubadel (Von) (1998), Cramon-Taubadel (Von) and Meyer (2000) 
introduced the symmetric/asymmetric error correction approach through an ex-
ante disaggregation of data. Within this framework, Bachmeier and Griffin 
(2003), Rao and Singh (2006), Rao and Rao (2008), presented an alternative 
dynamic approach, known as the disaggregated GETS model, originating from 
the LSE-Hendry GETS methodology. The main advantage of the model is that 
two different speeds of adjustments can simultaneously be estimated for 
positive and negative change in the variables included. In our case, it allows for 
the retail rates and the speed of adjustment coefficients to be analysed 
separately, when the wholesale rates are increasing or decreasing. 
The interest rate PT literature is mainly related to the way central bank (CB 
hereafter) and interbank money market rates (MM hereafter) are transmitted to 
the retail rates (deposit and lending). The equilibrium (long run) relationship 
between wholesale and retail rates is given by: 
       
tWR eii ++= 10 φφ
                                                         (1)    
where, Ri  stands for the different kind of loan and deposit rates, Wi is the CB or 
MM rates, 0φ  is the constant term, 1φ  measures the long-run impact of changes 
in wholesale interest rates and te is an error term. The short run dynamic 
interest rate adjustment equation, without any asymmetry, based on a simple 
error correction model (hereafter ECM) is: 
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Rao & Singh (2006) and Rao & Rao (2008) provide a complete derivation, 
formulation, and discussion of the specifications of symmetric and asymmetric 
interest rate adjustment equations. The short run dynamic interest rate 
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In GETS, 
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 and 
+θ
 are the speed of adjustment coefficients in the positive 
and negative case respectively and T is the time trend. The 1−te parameter in 
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equation (2) is replaced with its equivalent ( tRi ,  - φ0 - φ1 tWi , – φ2T )t-1 in 
equation (3). The latter is the error correction term of the model. Rao & Singh 
(2006) and Rao & Rao (2008) point out that the (+)/(–) superscript on the 
coefficients in equation (3), indicate a positive/negative change in the variables 
included in the model. For any positive change in the independent variable 
(∆ tWi , >0), a corresponding response of all positive coefficients (
+β
,
+θ ), is 
expected. On the other hand, the corresponding negative coefficients (
−β
,
−θ ) 
is assumed to respond in any negative change of the dependent variable 
(∆ tWi , <0). This model is estimated with Non-Linear Least Squares method.4 
We use monthly data collected from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
produced by the International Monetary Fund. Period of analysis for Greece is 
1999:01 - 2004:04 and for Bulgaria and Slovenia is 1999:01 - 2007:08. A 
consistent sample size across countries will be preferable, but unfortunately the 
IFS data for the Eurozone economies present a break in their series after 2004. 
For the retail rates, we use the deposit rate and the lending rate. Regarding the 
wholesale rates, we use the central bank and the money market rates (see also 
Appendix B for definitions of the IFS database series name).  
Before we proceed to the disaggregated GETS model implementation, we 
discuss whether it is necessary to test for the number of co-integrated vectors 
                                                 
4
 In econometric terms the corresponding “activation” will be triggered in equation 3 with the help of 
dummy variables. More specifically, all positive coefficients will take the value of 1, when a positive 
change in the dependent variable occurs, and will be zero otherwise. 
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between the dependent and the independent variables. Hendry5 repeatedly 
stated that if the underlying economic theory is correct, then the variables in the 
levels must be co-integrated and, therefore, a linear combination of the I(1) 
levels of the variables must be I(0). As this approach holds for the GETS 
model, it does not need to be pre-tested for co-integration. It can be said that 
the relationship between the retail interest rates (dependent variable) and 
wholesale interest rates (explanatory variables) in their levels, are a linear 
combination of I(1) variables and, thus, must be I(0). 
Although it is not necessary, we report unit root and co-integration tests 
(following Johansen, 1995 and Phillips-Ouliaris, 1990) for our data series. Prior 
expectation that interest rates (as most macroeconomic variables) should be 
I(1) in their levels, is confirmed for almost all series examined by using 
Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) test (see Table 1 in Appendix B for the 
results of ADF test). The number of the existing co-integrating vectors from the 
Johansen’s methodology, is sensitive to the number of lagged variables ( n ) of 
the initial vector (Johansen, 1995). Due to this sensitivity five different lag 
selection tests will be implemented; the modified Likelihood Ratio test statistic, 
the Final Prediction Error test, the Akaike, the Schwarz and finally the Hannan-
Quinn information criteria. In most of the examined cases, the aforementioned 
lag selection criteria do not all agree about the optimal lag length6. In such 
cases, the majority rule is applied as a sub-optimal solution. According to the 
                                                 
5
 See Hendry et al (1984), Hendry (1987) and Hendry and Krolzig (2005). 
6
 Results about the optimal lag structure using the five different selection criteria are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Eigenvalue and Trace tests from the Johansen’s methodology, in some of the 
bivariate cases, there is a unique co-integrated vector of order 1 (r=1), which 
supports the hypothesis that interest rates in the SEE economies tend to co-
integrate pairwise (Tables 3A-3C in Appendix B). However, the Phillips-
Ouliaris procedure (Table 2 in Appendix B) does not produce similar results 
(with the exception of Greece) as the Johansen’s methodology. This is not 
unusual in the relevant literature and other studies have also reported difficulty 
in establishing co-integrating relationships between wholesale rates and retail 
rates (Raunig and Scharler, 2009; Egert et al, 2007). 
 
4. Results 
We estimate the disaggregated GETS model for the two types of interest rates 
(wholesale and retail) in the economies analysed and we test the symmetry 
hypothesis, that is +θ = −θ . The existence of a symmetric speed of adjustment is 
tested by using the Wald 
2χ
- test. Our results provide an answer to the 
question set out at the outset; what is the effect of an upward or downward 
change in the policy-controlled variables to the retail rates in the there different 
banking systems. Our empirical tests for Greece, presented in Tables 4 and 5 in 
Appendix C, show that symmetry exists; banks tend to pass to depositors and 
borrowers equally decreases and increases of the original CB and MM rate 
changes. As far as the coefficients of the two error correction terms, +θ  and −θ , 
is concerned, are all statistically significant in all cases (Table 4, columns 1-4). 
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Wholesale rates’ increases and decreases are both transmitted to the deposit and 
loan rates, showing evidence of an efficient conduct of monetary policy. This 
result is in line with newer empirical evidence (Hondroyiannis et al, 1999; 
Hardy and Symiyiannis, 1998) about the structure of the Greek banking system, 
which support the hypothesis that there has been a gradual shift of the Greek 
banking system away from conditions of oligopoly to those of monopolistic 
competition. 
We present the results for Bulgaria in Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix C. When the 
wholesale rate is the CB rate ( CBi ) and the retail rate is the loan rate ( Li ), there 
is a negative asymmetry, which means that banks tend to pass to borrowers 
only decreases of the original CB rate changes. When the wholesale rate is the 
MM rate ( MMi ) and the retail rate is the loan rate ( Li ), again there is a negative 
asymmetry, which implies that banks tend to pass to borrowers only decreases 
of the original MM rate changes. In all other cases, +θ  and −θ are either 
incorrectly signed (Table 6, column 4) or statistically insignificant (column 1 
and 3).  
We present the results for Slovenia in Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix C. When the 
wholesale rate is the MM rate ( MMi ) and the retail rate is the deposit rate ( Di ), 
there is a negative asymmetry, meaning that banks tend to pass to depositors 
only decreases of the original MM rate changes. When the wholesale rate is the 
MM rate ( MMi ) and the retail rate is the loan rate ( Li ), again there is a negative 
asymmetry, indicating that banks tend to pass to borrowers only decreases of 
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the original MM rate changes. Regarding the coefficients of the error correction 
term, only −θ is statistically significant when the wholesale rate is the MM rate 
( MMi ) and the retail rates is either the deposit or the lending rate (Table 8, 
columns 3-4). Regarding the CB rate for Slovenia, data presents negligible 
variation and, thus, the GETS model does not produce any results for the speed 
of adjustment estimates. In this case, we can not perform the symmetry test.  
Our results for Bulgaria and Slovenia are consistent with the ccustomer 
reaction hypothesis regarding the loan market. The speed of retail rates 
adjustment can be interpreted as the commercial bank managers’ power to 
transmit to their clients any wholesale rate changes. Such speed is presumably 
affected by the degree of the retail market competitiveness in the banking 
sector. For example, in a competitive banking environment, bank managers are 
expected to decrease loan rates in response to wholesale rates decreases. The 
negative asymmetry results for Bulgaria and Slovenia might be explained by 
this framework. Asymmetry results for Bulgaria are consistent with section 2 
analysis. Although, the banking system in Slovenia is quite concentrated as 
described in section 2, our empirical results indicate that there are some signs 
of competition in its loan market. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study focuses on the symmetric or asymmetric effect of an upward or 
downward change in the policy-controlled variables (the official central bank 
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rate or the implicitly controlled money market rate by the Central Bank) to the 
retail rates in selected SEE economies. The empirical results for these 
economies are mixed regarding the symmetry hypothesis and the monetary 
transmission process. Our results for Greece provide support for symmetry in 
the adjustment of retail rates in response to changes in the central bank rate. In 
contrast, for Slovenia we find support for negative asymmetry in the 
adjustment of loan and deposit rates in response to changes in the money 
market rate. Also, results for Bulgaria support the negative asymmetry 
hypothesis in the adjustment of loan rate in response to changes in both the 
central bank and money market rates. This asymmetric behaviour can be 
interpreted as an indication of a different level of competition, development 
and liberalization among the banking systems in the SEE economies. Also, it is 
theoretically consistent with the customer reaction hypothesis regarding the 
loan market in Bulgaria and Slovenia. It is also in line with the bank’s collusive 
hypothesis regarding the deposit market in Slovenia. Policy interest rates play 
an important role in any economy and are crucial for Governments, commercial 
banks and investors’ decision making. We believe that our results can be useful 
for the SEE’s regulatory authorities in their attempt to monitor the 
competitiveness of their banking systems and reinforce financial system 
stability and effectiveness. This in turn will hopefully contribute to the 
macroeconomic stability of these economies. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Interest Rates and General Economic Background for the SEE 
Economies 
 
Figure 1. Wholesale & Retail Interest Rates  
in Bulgaria (1999:01 - 2007:08) 
Figure 2. Wholesale & Retail Interest Rates  
in Greece (1999:01 - 2004:04) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CB DE L MM
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
CB DE LO MM
 
Figure 3. Wholesale & Retail Interest Rates 
in Slovenia (1999:01 - 2007:08) 
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Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 
   Table 1. Economy & Income, 1999 – 2007 
 
GDP 
(billion $) 
GDP 
(per capita $) 
GDP 
(% change) 
GDP 
(PPP pc) 
Population 
(million ) 
Bulgaria 22.030 2,827.28 5.18 8,083.75 7.85 
Greece 199.992 18,070.55 4.22 22,793.32 11.05 
Slovenia 30.928 15,465.40 4.39 21,049.51 2.00 
   Source: World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
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Appendix B. International Financial Statistics Database Series Name 
 
Central Bank rates 
IFS 17460...ZF... CENTRAL BANK RATE-Greece 
IFS 91860...ZF... BANK RATE (END OF PERIOD)-Bulgaria 
IFS 96160...ZF... CENTRAL BANK RATE-Slovenia 
 
Money Market rates 
IFS 91860B..ZF... INTERBANK RATE-Bulgaria 
IFS 17460B..ZF... INTERBANK RATE (3-MONTH MATURITY)- Greece (Euro   
                                    Area Money Market rate) 
IFS 96160B..ZF... MONEY MARKET RATE-Slovenia 
 
Deposit rates 
IFS 91860L..ZF... DEPOSIT RATE-Bulgaria 
IFS 17460L..ZF... DEPOSIT RATE-Greece 
IFS 96160L..ZF... DEPOSIT RATE-Slovenia 
 
Lending rates 
IFS 91860P..ZF... LENDING RATE (Mortgage Rate)- Bulgaria 
IFS 17460P..ZF... WORKING CAP INDUSTRY- Greece 
IFS 96160P..ZF... LENDING RATE-Slovenia 
 
Appendix C. Unit Roots, Cointegration Test and Empirical Results 
 
Table 1. Unit Root Tests   
Variable ADF I(0) ADF I(1) 
Bulgaria 
CBi  -2.55 -11.72 
MMi  -3.04 -5.63 
Di  -2.68 -6.71 
Li  -2.74 -12.15 
Greece 
CBi  -0.90 -7.23 
MMi  -1.38 -4.92 
Di  -1.61 -4.71 
Li  -0.55 -5.21 
Slovenia 
CBi  -1.89 -12.41 
MMi  -4.58 -19.22 
Di  -3.08 -20.13 
Li  -3.61 -19.82 
The critical value is -3.45 at 5% significance level and -4.04 at 
1% significance level. 
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Table 2. The Phillips-Ouliaris Co-integration Test  
Pair of variables      
(with constant) ZP  test uP  test 
Bulgaria 
CBi  vs. Di  18.96 20.56 
CBi  vs. Li  15.91 21.65 
mmi  vs. Di  17.20 11.79 
mmi  vs. Li  13.37 12.58 
Greece 
CBi  vs. Di  1.41 5.02 
CBi  vs. Li  2.62 4.10 
mmi  vs. Di  1.07 3.03 
mmi  vs. Li  2.14 3.25 
Slovenia 
CBi  vs. Di  20.71 19.43 
CBi  vs. Li  17.57 19.53 
mmi  vs. Di  13.49 10.44 
mmi  vs. Li  11.16 11.13 
The critical values for the ZP  and the uP tests are 55.22 and 
33.71, respectively (at 5% significance level).  
 
Table 3A. The Johansen Pairwise Co-intregration Tests for Greece 
Causality 
test 
No. of  
Lags 
Rank 
Max.  
Eigenvalue 
Trace 
No. of  Co-integrating 
Vectors (r) 
r=0 3.60 5.64 
CBi  vs. Di  (2) 
r≤1 2.04 2.04 
r=0 
r=0 8.72 11.47 
CBi  vs. Li  (2) r≤1 2.74 2.74 r=0 
r=0 7.17 9.36 
mmi  vs. Di  (1) r≤1 2.18 2.18 r=0 
r=0 6.91 11.00 
mmi  vs. Li  (1)  r≤1 4.09 4.09 r=0 
          
 Table 3B. The Johansen Pairwise Co-intregration Tests for Bulgaria 
Causality 
test 
No. of  
Lags 
Rank 
Max.  
Eigenvalue 
Trace 
No. of  Co-integrating 
Vectors (r) 
r=0 5.98 8.39 
CBi  vs. Di  (2) 
r≤1 2.40 2.40 
r=0 
r=0 18.05 20.80 
CBi  vs. Li  (2) 
r≤1 2.74 2.74 
r=1 
r=0 36.45 39.64 
mmi  vs. Di  (1) r≤1 3.18 3.18 r=1 
r=0 24.67 27.47 
mmi  vs. Li  (1)  r≤1 2.79 2.79 r=1 
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Table 3C. The Johansen Pairwise Co-intregration Tests for Slovenia 
Causality 
test 
No. of  
Lags 
Rank 
Max.  
Eigenvalue 
Trace 
No. of  Co-integrating 
Vectors (r) 
r=0 35.35 37.90 
CBi  vs. Di  (2) 
r≤1 2.55 2.55 
r=1 
r=0 42.15 44.30 
CBi  vs. Li  (2) r≤1 2.15 2.15 r=1 
r=0 8.23 10.00 
mmi  vs. Di  (1) r≤1 1.76 1.76 r=0 
r=0 7.26 9.15 
mmi  vs. Li  (1)  r≤1 1.89 1.89 r=0 
The critical value for accepting the hypothesis that r=1 at the 5% significance level for both the 
Maximum Eigenvalue test and the Trace test, is 3.84. 
 
Table 4. Estimates for Speed of Adjustment for Greece 
Independent 
variable Central bank ( CBi ) rate Money Market ( mmi ) rate 
Dependent 
variable 
Deposit rate 
( Di ) 
Loan rate 
( Li ) 
Deposit rate 
( Di ) 
Loan rate 
( Li ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
+θ  -0.15 (-3.16) -0.13 (-3.20) -0.14 (-2.82) -0.13 (-2.91) 
−θ  -0.15 (-3.21) -0.14 (-3.23) -0.15 (-3.00) -0.13 (-2.94) 
 
Table 5. Symmetry Hypothesis: Results for Greece 
Model 
Hypothesis 
H0 : ( −+ = θθ )* 
Result 
CBi  vs. Di  0.76 symmetry 
CBi  vs. Li  
 
1.10 symmetry 
mmi  vs. Di  4.68 symmetry  
mmi  vs. Li  
 
0.006 symmetry 
 
Table 6. Estimates for Speed of Adjustment for Bulgaria  
Independent 
variable Central bank ( CBi ) rate Money Market ( mmi ) rate 
Dependent 
variable 
Deposit rate 
( Di ) 
Loan rate 
( Li ) 
Deposit rate 
( Di ) 
Loan rate 
( Li ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
+θ  -0.000002 (-0.002) -0.08 (-1.84) -0.0000008 (-0.002) 0.12 (2.96) 
−θ  -0.000007 (-0.002) -0.13 (-2.67) -0.0001 (-0.002) -0.22 (-4.12) 
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Table 7. Symmetry Hypothesis: Results for Bulgaria 
Model 
Hypothesis 
H0 : ( −+ = θθ ) 
Result 
CBi  vs. Di  - - 
CBi  vs. Li  
 
Only the negative 
change ( −θ ) is  
statistically significant 
Negative 
 (-) asymmetry 
mmi  vs. Di  - - 
mmi  vs. Li  
 
Only the negative 
change ( −θ ) is  
statistically significant 
Negative 
 (-) asymmetry 
We test the symmetry hypothesis by applying the Wald (x2) 
test. The critical value of x2 statistic with one degree of 
freedom is 3.84 at 5% confidence level and 5.02 (at 2.5% 
confidence level). 
 
Table 8: Estimates for Speed of Adjustment for Slovenia 
Independent 
variable Central bank ( CBi ) rate Money Market ( mmi ) rate 
Dependent 
variable 
Deposit rate  
( Di ) 
Loan rate  
( Li ) 
Deposit rate 
( Di ) 
Loan rate 
( Li ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
Coefficients - 
t-ratios 
+θ  0.009 (0.13) 0.11 (1.54) 
−θ  
GETS N/A GETS N/A 
-0.37 
(-5.88) 
-0.24 
(-4.27) 
 
Table 9. Symmetry Hypothesis: Results for Slovenia  
Model 
Hypothesis 
H0 : ( −+ = θθ ) Result 
CBi  vs. Di  - - 
CBi  vs. Li  - - 
mmi  vs. Di  
Only the negative 
change ( −θ ) is  
statistically significant 
Negative 
 (-) asymmetry 
mmi  vs. Li  
Only the negative 
change ( −θ ) is  
statistically significant 
Negative 
 (-) asymmetry 
We test the symmetry hypothesis by applying the Wald (x2) 
test. The critical value of x2 statistic with one degree of 
freedom is 3.84 at 5% confidence level and 5.02 (at 2.5% 
confidence level). 
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